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Abstract  
 
During the 20th Century, both Germany and Spain had atrocities committed against 
specific groups of people at home under fascist leaderships. Both countries 
democratised with the death of their leader, leaving members from the previous 
regime in power. However, two very different approaches to reconciliation were 
taken. Germany prosecuted the leaders of the old regime, implemented collective guilt 
across the population, and either destroyed fascist memorials and insignias or actively 
challenged them with counter-memorials. As opposed to following the German path 
to reconciliation, the fruits of which could be seen during the democratisation of 
Spain, the new democracy decided to implement the 1975 Pact of Forgetting, an 
unwritten agreement to not bring up the atrocities committed under Franco for fear of 
retribution. In order to understand the events that led to two very different outcomes 
through the use of interviews, analysis of the Suárez’s cabinet, and analysis of the use 
of memorials in both cases, this paper will ask why did Spain choose to avoid a 
similar reconciliation process to the one taken by West Germany thirty years prior 
despite being in a similar state and what role did public history play? 
  
 
Silenced Ghosts: A comparison of Spanish and German “reconciliation” 
attempts   
 
Berlin currently suffers from a spate of dark tourism known as the ‘YOLOCAUST’ 
where people climb the concrete slabs of the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of 
Europe meant to represent the trains used in the holocaust to transport Jews and 
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instead repurpose them as props and backdrops in their selfies. Although signage for 
the memorial is not as prominent as it could be, the Memorial to the Murdered Jews 
of Europe is yet another example of the German “counter-memorial” trend whereby 
the narrative of uncertainty due its simplistic design contrasting overly glorified 
fascist memorials, leaves the burden of remembrance with the viewer (Young et al. 
1998).  
However, Spain, another former fascist state with a similar democratisation 
process, has almost none of this culture of memorialisation and instead relies mainly 
on existing fascist memorials like Valle de los Caídos to memorialise victims – the 
same monuments at which far-right members give fascist salutes. Under the title 
Silenced Ghosts, an intentional nod to the ground-breaking works of Tremlett in 
Ghosts of Spain and Auchter’s The Politics of Haunting and Memory in International 
Relations that inspired this paper, this paper will fill two gaps in literature concerning 
the West German and Spanish attempts to reach reconciliation. The first gap in 
literature concerning the role of the elites behind the different reconciliation attempts, 
and the second being the lack of Spanish and West German case comparisons, given 
their similarities.  
How did memorialisation become so abstract in one country and so reliant on 
the old in another considering the similarities in democratisation processes and the 
crimes that they memorialise? Although both states committed similar crimes and 
members of the old regime remained in some positions of power, a choice was made 
whether or not to address the past through the destruction and contextualisation of 
remnants of the old regime and counter-narratives in the form of memorials and 
museums. With rising tensions, advancements in transitional justice, and better access 
to information, it is important to now ask why did Spain choose to avoid a similar 
reconciliation process to the one taken by West Germany thirty years prior despite 
being in a similar state and what role did public history play? 
In recent months, the Spanish government has come down hard on the once 
devolved region of Catalonia through the use of police violence and imposing its 
control through direct rule as a reaction to an independence vote that it ruled as being 
illegal. This seemingly sudden and unusually aggressive reaction to a vote within a 
European Union state is no freak miscalculation on the government’s part; it is the 
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calculated and purposeful reaction of a group of people with a specific mindset 
shaped by history.  
During the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), the Catalonian government chose 
to fight along side the Republicans, Franco’s adversaries. Displeased with the 1936 
election victory by the Progressive Popular Front, Franco instigated a military 
uprising against the Second Republic from his base in Morocco. This conflict pitted 
loyalist republicans that included the navy, police, the left, liberals and areas vying for 
devolution, against nationalists that included the army, air force, the right and 
royalists. The conflict is believed to have claimed 175,000 republican lives, 110,000 
nationalist lives and 125,000 civilian lives (Sandler 2002, 160). Atrocities including, 
but not limited to, mass rape, mass murder of prisoners, and systematic murder of 
suspected leftists, liberals and freemasons under Franco were reported during and 
after the Spanish Civil War claiming as many as 200,000 lives (Beevor 2006, 156, 
315, 330). In reaction, underground republican groups like the ETA coordinated terror 
attacks.  
Following the bloody victory, Franco quickly cracked down on all aspects of 
Catalan identity from the banning of Catalan being spoken through to the removal of 
its government. Catalan was swiftly replaced with Spanish - the start of what some 
deem to be “Franco’s attempts of cultural genocide” (Moreno 2001, 1). This was by 
no means restricted to only Catalonia as Franco sought to implement the same 
policies in the Valencian, Basque, Galician, Aranese, Asturian, Leonese, Aragonese 
Extremaduran, and Fala communities in order to create a single Spanish nation-state.  
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(http://i.imgur.com/f9NakYj.png) 
As authoritarians and their regimes go, Franco had the best possible outcome 
as he left this world on his own terms and many of his allies that he left behind were 
able to keep their jobs as the Spanish transition to democracy was thought to be better 
facilitated if all sides verbally agreed to forget and instead focus on the future through 
the 1975 Pact of Forgetting. However, this simple choice to look to the future left 
many Francoist structures standing and denied victims memorialisation and their 
families any chance of dialogue to garner reconciliation. There is no single normative 
form of reconciliation or path to it, but the general concept can at best be defined as 
“the end of a disagreement and the return to friendly relations” (The Oxford English 
Dictionary 2013, 603). What this meant was that in the years following the Pact of 
Forgetting, there is evidence to suggest that far right groups in Spain, such as Alianza 
Popular, its successor party the Partido Popular, and more recently VOX supporters, 
comparable to other European far right groups, were allowed a platform to oppose 
any form of separatism, let alone calls for justice as this paper will later explain.  
Calls for justice were easily deflected with through the lack of counter-
narratives and the use of structures like the Valle de los Caídos that proclaimed 
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reconciliation although built with slave labour (Alcaine 2010, 5). With right-wing 
figures like as Carlos Arias Navarro claiming to speak with Franco’s ghost, Franco’s 
ghost still had agency in Spanish politics (Preston 2004, 392). Memorials like Valle 
de los Caídos that memorialised the Civil War and seemingly deflected conspiracies 
by the left became important places of pilgrimage and testament to the elite’s memory 
(Preston 2004, 392). Such groups have become increasingly vocal of their stance that 
any separatism or investigation into the past is a threat to what they regard as Spain 
and Spanish culture.  
What boggles the mind most when looking at the reaction to the Catalonian 
independence vote is not the far right or police brutality, but the fact that the ruling 
Partido Popular party enables, and in some cases orders, such sentiment and action 
against the Catalans to take place in accordance with Franco’s one Spain approach. 
The stance of the Partido Popular is very much reflective of some of its known 
Francoist membership and the fact that in the Spanish population one in three 
consider Franco in his actions to be a positive historical figure – a saviour of Spain, 
even if they do not necessarily agree with the atrocities committed against 
republicans, socialists, liberals, communists, and others on the basis of hearsay (El 
Mundo 2006) (Guarino 2010, 65).  
In the interest of accuracy and relevancy, this paper will use a reputable 
method of taxonomisation and four leading concepts in the field of memory studies 
and international relations; transitional justice, vehicles for memory, memory 
entrepreneurs, and memory politics. 
Transitional justice is now seen as the path to achieving reconciliation post-
conflict. However there are two definitions. The more liberal definition is “to strike a 
balance between redressing the abuses of the former governments and integrating 
victims and perpetrators in a postconflict society” (Piccone 1996, 541). On the other 
hand, the more orthodox definition is to, “characterize the choices made and quality 
of justice rendered when new leaders replace authoritarian predecessors presumed 
responsible for criminal acts in the wake of the ‘third wave of democratization’” 
(Siegel 1998, 433). Regardless of there being no one definition, both ensure the 
recognition of the crimes committed by the authoritarian predecessors and the 
judgement of said predecessors for said crimes. It is commonly accepted that the 
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history of transitional justice started post-Second World War with the International 
Military Tribunal and although the legal construct that ensures processes nowadays 
was non-existent back then, the tribunal with its novice concepts of transitional justice 
was successful (McGonigle Leyh 2016, 559). However, the early example that 
Nuremberg set, even without the three decades worth of legal developments since, 
was not enough to entice the Spanish transitional government.  
Two contrasting stand points that were once intolerant of the other’s existence 
have been able to coexist relatively peacefully in Spain since the death of Franco due 
to the Pact of Forgetting that also came in 1975. The Pact of Forgetting is a spoken 
contact between the different political parties to avoid confrontation over the past, to 
safeguard the amnesties granted to perpetrators of crimes dating back to the Civil War 
and to ensure a future based on cooperation (Encarnación 2008, 437). In order to 
create an unspoken agreement whereby all could look to the future, Adolfo Suárez, 
King Carlos’s transitional prime minister, first needed to get the recently legalised left 
to the table. This was accomplished through partial amnesties for left-wing political 
prisoners with the 30th July 1976 amnesty and a full amnesty for ETA terrorists on 
20th May 1977 after threats of a continued campaign of terror (Preston 2004, 389). 
The unspoken agreement was later enforced by the Law 46/1977 of 15th October 1977 
Of Amnesty or the “Amnesty Law” under Suarez’s democratic government. The 
partial and full amnesty laws acted as speedy means to avoid conflict between 
factions now that Franco was dead and the state was starting to democratise. As the 
Amnesty Law allowed crimes to be amnestied and criminal records to be destroyed, it 
“precluded any formal treatment of the past” ruling out any possibility of transitional 
justice allowing a schism in memory to remain between the different factions (Law 
46/1977) (Encarnación 2008, 437).  
Memory is separate from experience as experience is “subjectively lived, 
culturally shared, and “shareable”” (Jelin 2003, 24). Memory, has to be triggered by 
discourse as “whenever and wherever there are subjects who share a culture, social 
agents who try to “materialize” the meanings of the past in different cultural products 
that are conceived as, or can be converted into, “vehicles for memory,” such as books, 
museums, monuments, films, and history books” (Jelin 2003, 24-25). One of the ways 
memory can be “materialized” is through the politicisation of memory, how memory 
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can be manipulated by policymakers and individuals of power to their own ends. Jelin 
terms the people that “seek social recognition and political legitimacy of one (their 
own) interpretation or narrative of the past” as “memory entrepreneurs” (Jelin 2003, 
33-34). The gap between enduring an event and actually recalling an event, that 
allows it to be a memory, is a space for “cultural and artistic activity” to take place to 
form vehicles for memory that can best represent the memory (Huyssen 2012, 3).  
Memorials are the prime example of a vehicle for memory as their discourse is 
designed to trigger memory in order to keep memory of an event or person alive. On 
this basis, memorials play a large role in the reconciliation process as markers of the 
“mutual recognition and acceptance” expected of reconciliation hence the interest in 
memorials that this paper takes (Bar-Tal and Bennink 2004, 15).  
The schism in memory between different groups of the Spanish populous is 
very much reflective of the possibility of many competing memories and truths. In the 
words of Jelin, “the space of memory is an arena of political struggle that is 
frequently conceived in terms of a struggle “against oblivion” […] however […] in 
truth, what is at stake is an opposition of “memory against memory”” (Jelin 2003, 
xviii). Franco is one of the most prolific memory entrepreneurs as he taught Spaniards 
over generations amongst other things to believe that his coup was nothing more than 
a well-received “rebellion” against a “leftist-Communist rebellion” and the violence 
that it brought with it (Southworth 1963, 9-33). In choosing to look to a future without 
documents of the old regime or excavation sites to enable investigations into the 
atrocities, the elites that agreed upon the 1975 Pact of Forgetting also agreed upon the 
hegemonic Francoist memory. Until the memory struggle is allowed to end through 
investigation, the memories of Franco’s victims and their families are doomed to the 
status of “claims” rather than history (Stern 2016, 121).  
Although the work of Steve Stern revolves around the later regime of Pinochet 
in Chile, this paper will follow Stern’s approach of taxonomising the memories of the 
period as Pinochet’s regime, like Franco’s, came about following a coup against a 
left-wing elected government. Like in Spain, the systematic atrocities were hidden 
from public view giving rise to the elites’ hegemonic memory of events. Stern’s work 
separates the different parties into two main opposing groups: “the human rights 
camp” and “the junta and its supporters” (Stern 2016, 125-126). The human rights 
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camp is comprised of political prisoners, activists in civil society, the victims and the 
relatives of the disappeared whilst the junta and its supporters are made up primarily 
of the Catholic Church, police and military forces and the government that cooperated 
with them (Stern 2016, 119-126).  
As in Chile, these two groups in Spain held conflicting memories of the cause 
and legacy of the Spanish Civil War that formed the memory struggle. For the junta 
and its supporters, their memory, the hegemonic memory, was that the republicans 
had started the Civil War violently with backing from the USSR and that Franco had 
provided a way to protect themselves from a coming atheist, communist regime 
(Babiano-Mora 1992) (Ellwood 2014, 113). Considering murders, rapes and false 
imprisonments as well as restrictions on language and reproduction had been used 
against the suspected republican population in the name of falangism, a Spanish 
fascist ideology, there was a fear of revenge reinforced by memories of republican 
violence during the Civil War and on-going insurgency (Preston 1986, 520). The 
human rights camp held different memories of a war that they believed to have been 
started by the falangists as part of a larger proxy war waged by fascists looking to 
capture Spain (Babiano-Mora 1992). It must be noted at this point that the difference 
in experience and power between a majority of the human rights camp and the 
Catalan nationalist bourgeoisie under Franco’s rule and during the transition period is 
so vast that they cannot be boxed together as little victimisation was felt and their 
opposition was based primarily around independence (Martín-Cabrera 2011, 157, 
186). This situation placed and continues to place the human rights camp in a difficult 
situation where they are represented by a political elite with little interest in pursuing 
justice all the while a doctored history fostered for decades under Franco’s regime and 
adopted by succeeding governments only reinforces the struggle over memory. 
Because the truths of the human rights camp contradict the Franco approved official 
narrative, any attempt at reconciliation through a truth commission or any other 
method in the foreseeable future would risk breaching the Pact of Forgetting 
(Encarnación 2008, 440). This comes as the pact is an alternative to transitional 
justice and ensures a focus on the future rather than any confrontation over the past.  
On this basis, the old age of the victims and the decades of misinformation 
pose the largest threats to the memory and truths of the human rights camp. In order 
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to keep the scope of this paper as narrow as possible, this paper will save the memory 
of the human right camp for another paper that can do it justice and instead only focus 
on the memory of the elites that agreed upon the 1975 Pact of Forgetting. 
 
Literature review: Western Politics  
 
It is now understood that memory holds value for both western politics and global 
politics as a whole as Auchter, the first to apply memory studies to international 
relations theory, explained that memory has serious implications for statecraft. These 
implications come about as not only do the living have agency, but so do the dead 
which is complicated by the impossibility to govern the “ghostly” (Auchter 2014, 29). 
The knowledge of bodies being out there is enough to influence the political 
landscape through the voting public as “decisions of life or death” form political 
identities and so memory can influence statecraft through identity politics (Auchter 
2014, 7, 119).  
 
This understanding of memory has come off the back of memory and human 
rights being politicised to the extent that they became respected political tools. Moyn 
and Huyssen argue that human rights give value to the memories of human rights 
violations that had inspired their creation (Moyn 2010, 2) (Huyssen 2015, 29). On this 
basis Huyssen and Teitel argue that although memory and human rights are normally 
separated by “disciplinary specialization”, they are nevertheless intrinsically linked 
and so should be grouped together (Huyssen 2015, 28, 32). The focus of human rights 
and memory discourse historiography is primarily split between three points in 
history, pre-20th Century, post-Second World War and 1970s onwards.  
 
 Human rights discourses really took off in the 1970s when they transcended 
the confines of the state with Moyn, Huyssen and Alston referencing Jimmy Carter’s 
1977 inauguration speech, the rise of NGOs, and the boom in human rights and 
memory discourse that came with them (Huyssen 2015, 27) (Alston 2013, 2044). 
Unfortunately, it wouldn’t be until during the 1980s that the recognition and success 
of human rights discourse would reach memory discourse. This is due in part to a 
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trickle down effect of the success of human rights discourse and in part due to the 
boom in vehicles for memory like the Holocaust documentary series that brought 
memory discourse into the mainstream and brought memories of the atrocities to 
younger audiences (Huyssen 2003, 12). These audiences were both domestic and 
foreign and allowed for shift of focus from the war to atrocities against the Jewish 
population (Huyssen 2003, 12).  
 The construction of multiple holocaust museums during this period, most 
notably the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington led not only to globalised 
memories of the holocaust, but Americanised memories of the holocaust (Huyssen 
2003, 13). Moyn and Huyssen argue that the human rights utopia currently being 
pursued in Western politics and the attached memory discourses only truly took off 
after the failures of earlier attempts at a utopia undertaken by fascism and 
communism left a new goal for societies to strive for (Huyssen 2015, 28). With the 
completion of the Washington Holocaust Memorial Museum in 1993 and a new 
utopian dream needed, Huyssen and Cohen see the “Americanization” of the 
holocaust memories as being the building block upon which the U.S. led Western 
powers built their interventionist foreign policy and R2P around (Huyssen 2003, 13) 
(Huyssen 2015, 30).  
Comparisons have always been made between current atrocities and past 
atrocities that have been punished for example the comparison of the slave trade and 
the Nazi atrocities during the 1940s (Martinez 2014, 14). Western powers using the 
Americanised holocaust memory as a building block for foreign policy have only 
increased such comparisons, putting memory discourse history back into the spotlight. 
However, comparisons encouraged by interventionist foreign policy are not without 
criticism as although able to “energize some discourses of traumatic memory”, 
Huyssen and others fear the potential of the comparisons to overlook local politics 
and history (Huyssen 2000, 24). Memory discourse history has also flourished due to 
a “more complex interrelationship between state power, moral ideas, and domestic 
and international legal institutions than many contemporary theories of international 
law and relations acknowledge” (Martinez 2014, 14).  
In conclusion, memory discourse has a reliance upon human rights discourse 
that has enabled its international recognition since the 1980s. This international 
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recognition has only been fostered under the Western interventionism of the 1990s 
that increased the number of comparisons made that kept memory discourse in 
academia. With the dead having agency through the influence of memory on 
statecraft, worldwide recognition of memory discourse through its relationship with 
human rights discourse, and the rise of initiatives dedicated to protecting human rights 
and memory, there were plenty of tools at Spain’s disposal to ensure reconciliation 
should one have been attempted. 
 
Literature review: Spain 
Although investigating and even discussing the atrocities committed under Franco are 
treated very seriously as seen with the prosecution of the human rights investigator 
Baltasar Garzón back in 2012 that was met with international attention and 
condemnation, there is still surprisingly little literature published on the subject.  This 
comes as survivors strive to make their experiences public before they die, historians 
strive to record more on an under-investigated subject, and the Francoists promote a 
counter-narrative that continues the legacy of Franco and shames the survivors and 
families of victims into keeping quiet (Encarnación 2014, 111-112).  
As Encarnación points out, with such a focus on the role of the Amnesty Law, 
little literature extends to the Pact of Forgetting let alone looks at those behind the 
pact (Encarnación 2008, 456). For far too long academics such as Labanyi have only 
mentioned the pact in passing leaving readers with ambiguous descriptions. For 
example, Labanyi argues that the Franco memorials and the attached obsessions 
paved the way to a “desire to break with the past; it was not, as is often argued, a 
determination to forget, but a decision not to let the past affect the future” during the 
democratising period (Labanyi 2007). This is not particularly clear and can be 
interpreted in different ways from a less sceptical interpretation being that the 
intention was never to forget, but to focus on a more constructive future through to a 
more sceptical interpretation being that the policymakers did not want the past 
affecting their future, making the Pact of Forgetting nothing more than a state 
enforced amnesty for those responsible and a gag on those pursuing accountability.  
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Of what little literature takes a specific stance concerning the Pact of 
Forgetting, there are two schools of thought; the continuation school of thought, best 
exemplified in the work of Moa, and the revisionist school of thought, best 
exemplified in the work of and arguably headed by Preston. Like the name suggests, 
the continuation school of thought continues and strengthens the narrative nurtured 
under Franco of a dangerous Left. This culminates in Moa circulating Francoist myths 
in arguing for the less sceptical interpretation by blaming the left in general for 
starting the Spanish Civil War and explaining that much of Franco’s less favourable 
actions were mere reactions based on leftist actions and for these reasons the pact of 
silence, Moa’s name for the Pact of Forgetting, only extends to the left (Moa 2003). 
An admirer of Moa’s work and fellow practitioner of the continuation school of 
thought is Stanley G. Payne. Payne, like Moa blames the Left for a disproportionally 
large amount of the violence and its role in the start of the Spanish Civil War (Payne 
1990, 269). Like Moa and others in the continuation school of thought, Payne is 
unacademic in voicing his disagreement with the revisionist school of thought, go as 
far as to refer to the work of Preston as little more than a “narrow obsessive” that 
“writes up wartime Republican propaganda as a sort of history” without any form of 
justification (Sesia and Payne interview 2017). The shared characteristics of the 
continuation school of thought go even further as Payne, like Moa, has also been 
branded a pseudo-historian accused of omitting new specialist revisions in 
historiography from his works and ignoring major influences such as the role of the 
landowners in the establishment of Franco’s regime in order for him to make the 
sweeping generalisations in favour of their stance that the continuation school of 
thought is known for (Viñas et al. 2015, 111). It is therefore unsurprising that Payne 
believes the Pact of Forgetting never existed and the term to be nothing more than a 
“propaganda slogan” reflective of the Left’s “paranoia” (Payne 2011, 251).  
Although revisionist schools of thought have received a bad wrap, the 
revisionist school of thought is devoid of the nationalist myths circulated by the 
continuation school of thought, as it is made up of foreign Hispanophiles less likely to 
have bias when retracing Spanish history from the Spanish Civil War. Preston is more 
explicit in taking the side of the more sceptical interpretation in arguing that “those 
guilty of the atrocities would never contemplate any reconciliation with the defeated 
for fear of the vengeance of their victims”, and that they didn’t have to as a long and 
S1414186 13	
effective reign under Franco had allowed a heavily doctored history to take hold 
leading to a “sociological Francoism” that caused an inability to “look upon its recent 
violent past in an open and honest way” meaning that confrontation was never a 
possibility (Preston 1986, 520). Preston goes on to discuss the fact that none of the 
Republicans that had committed atrocities during the Spanish Civil War were alive in 
Spain at the time of its signing as “those who did not escape into exile were either 
tried during the war itself by the Republican authorities or else afterwards by the 
Francoists” (Preston 1986). This implies that the Pact of Forgetting was created with 
only Francoists, like Adolfo Suárez, that “had no reason whatsoever to resuscitate old 
quarrels” in mind (Encarnación 2008). It also left those in the opposition in a position 
where they had no choice but to sign. Encarnación describes the situation as being 
that the “Left-wing leaders were also cognizant of the political environment in which 
the transition unfolded, especially rising political violence, and did not wish to pursue 
any policy that would make a delicate situation even more so” (Encarnación 2014).  
Overlooking the accusations of bias and questionable scholarly approaches, 
the continuation school’s literature is by no means of no relevance to this paper as 
there is value in its empathetic approach to creation of what some believe to be the 
Pact of Forgetting. After stating that the Pact of Forgetting does not exist in Spain: A 
Unique History, Payne went on to explain that it was never about forgetting as the 
transitional government knew the failures and decided to avoid repeating them and 
the “silence” was a matter of leaving the debates to scholars (Payne 2011, 251). His 
defence for the Partido Popular’s defensiveness during the early 2000s when criticsms 
of the lack of investigations into past atrocities were aired is that the left had only 
brought up the subject as a way to “wave the bloody shirt” when they weren’t doing 
well in the polls (Payne 2011, 251). 
Although revisionists Encarnación and Preston both agree that the Spanish 
political left was left with little choice but to agree to the terms of the Pact of 
Forgetting, the writers disagree over the role of Adolfo Suárez and in turn present him 
differently. Encarnación presents Suárez as a reasonable figure within Spanish 
political history by noting his position as the head of the first democratic government 
post-Franco and legalisation of the communist party, as well as attempting to 
rationalise Suárez’s past as a Francoist official, explaining that “he was a former 
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Francoist official […] as were many in the leadership of his centrist party” 
(Encarnación 2008). What Encarnación appears to miss or exclude from this brief 
introduction of Suárez is his major role as the Director-General of the Spanish Radio 
and Television Corporation under Franco. A position that would have put Suárez in 
charge of Franco’s propaganda. Encarnación is also biased in making the assumption 
that the left was just as uninterested in re-examining the past as Francoists like Suárez 
in stating that due to the lack of any resistance from left, the leftist leadership during 
the 1980s and 1990s was “entirely disinterested in revisiting the past” (Encarnación 
2008). Preston on the other hand acknowledges Suárez’s role as the “ideal man to 
dismantle the Francoist system” under King Carlos during the transition, however he 
notes that once the objective was complete he was no longer of use (Preston 2004, 
382). Having become head of his own party to the discontent of the King and 
following the retirement of his handler, Torcuato Fernández-Miranda, in May 1976, 
he could now realise his long-term political ambition without anyone to answer to 
implying that any policy or decision under Suárez post-May 1976 was not necessarily 
in the interest of those that democratised Spain (Preston 2004, 391). 
Compared with the biased and the non-peer reviewed work of the Francoist 
writer and accused pseudo-historian, Moa, the peer reviewed works should be able to 
shed a lot more light on the subject of the Pact of Forgetting. However, even as a 
piece of historical academia by an accredited historian, the article only makes 
reference to Suárez as one of the many Francoists and opposition figures that drew up, 
agreed upon, and benefited from the Pact of Forgetting without really specifying who 
did what and why (Cattini 2011, 34). This leaves a clear gap in literature concerning 
the Spanish democratising process and a key part of modern Spanish history (Cattini 
2011, 34). Given the critical eye that the revisionist school of thought has towards 
revisions in historiography and its relatively lesser bias, this paper will primarily 
make use of the revisionist school of thought in order to be as accurate and up to date 
in its arguments. That being said, the continuation school of thought does hold merit 
in having empathy for the subjects discussed and so its literature will be taken into 
account to make this a more rounded paper. With a revisionist school approach and 
continuation school empathy, this paper will be one of the first to analyse both the 
role that Suárez and his cabinet had in forming the pact, what they stood to gain from 
the pact and the relationship that the different actors had.  
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Literature review: West Germany 
 
Many if faced with the research question “why did Spain choose to avoid a similar 
reconciliation process to the one taken by West Germany thirty years prior despite 
being in a similar state?” would simply answer that the allies were able to apply the 
pressure to sow the seeds of reconciliation through denazification and democratisation 
processes following their invasion, an assumption that has deterred comparisons and 
investigations into the Spanish case - something that this paper aims to change. The 
assumption is inspired by a revisionist school of thought that included academics such 
as Dobbins, Diamond, Linz, Lipset, Peceny and Dempsey supported by the CATO 
Institute and RAND Corporation that asserted that democracy in West Germany was 
installed by the U.S. as justification for the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Payne 2006, 210). 
The revisionist school of thought’s exaggerated heroisation of the role of the U.S. has 
led to the assumption that West Germany was unwilling enough to democratise on its 
own that academics like Mihr have grouped its democratisation with that of Turkey 
and Spain in pieces that unfoundedly describe “democratic flaws or deficits”, “violent 
suppression of minorities”, “detention of protestors”, “biased and political trials”, and 
“expulsion of political parties” (Mihr 2018, 27). 
 
However, the old school of thought establishes that much of the democratic 
apparatus in West Germany was German and established in the final days of the Nazi 
regime – a fortnight before the U.S. arrival in Berlin (Payne 2006, 217). The West 
Germans also undertook the creation of their constitution that ensured a democratic 
structure (Davidson 1957, 237). That being said, there is one thing the U.S. and its 
allies can take credit for and that is denazification, the brainchild of a few members of 
the Washington and London political elite that believed that guilt should not be 
reserved to just the Nazi elites (Berghahn 2004, 130). The idea of a collective 
punishment came out of the assumption that all members of the Nazi party and any of 
the public affiliated with them were staunch believers, an assumption that may well 
have inspired the assumptions and ideas of the revisionist school of thought. On the 
other hand, the old school are quick to point out that the population were not 
captivated by the ideology of Nazism as Churchill and Morgenthau, the fathers of 
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denazification, would have people believe and so on that basis, the Spanish 
population were no more guilty, but were never made to face it (Berghahn 2004, 130).  
 
Under the allied denazification process, memory had likely the strongest role 
it has ever had as only allegations of Nazi affiliation or crimes were enough to find a 
person guilty (Payne 2006, 215). A majority of academics including Huyssen of the 
revisionist school of thought and Payne of the old school of thought focus primarily 
on the allied use of memory in the trials that followed the Second World War and the 
human rights that they inspired. However, few look at what happened beyond 1951 
when the allies had given up on denazificaton after it was perceived to be ineffective 
and the West Germans actively opposed it leaving a gap in literature as to how and 
why West Germans continued to spread the idea of a collective liability and in some 
cases guilt that can still be seen today when they regained control (Steinweis and 
Rogers 2003, 235). Frei argues that the collective guilt enforced by a foreign nation in 
West Germany was disliked by the local population and when denazification was 
halted in 1951, a very different guilt was observed, one that literature has failed to 
properly document (Frei 2002, xiii, 1, 3). Denazification had taught West Germans to 
feel guilt for their roles and contacts under the Nazi regime, however the guilt that 
arose in 1951 was one of a general guilt for what had happened, but they maintained 
that guilt should not lie with them for their connections and actions, but rather with 
the Nazi figureheads (Frei 2002, xiii, 1, 3). On this basis, this paper will add to the 
currently lacking literature left by both schools of thought by examining how exactly 
memory was handled by West German society using a better understanding of the 
guilt post-denazification.  
Why wasn’t transitional justice an option in Spain? Paige argues that 
transitional justice only moved from naming and shaming by activists to claims to 
“justice that prioritized legal-institutional reforms and responses – such as punishing 
leaders, vetting security forces, and replacing state secrecy with truth and 
transparency – over other claims to justice that were oriented toward social justice and 
redistribution” during the 1980s starting with the Bolivian National Commission of 
Inquiry into Disappearances in 1982, five years after Spain transitioned to democracy 
(Paige 2009, 321). However, this is not enough to excuse the failure to reconcile in 
Spain after Franco as there are earlier examples of democratisation like that of West 
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Germany post-Second World War where the tearing down of Nazi memorials and 
insignia were common practice. Most importantly, the West German example is not 
only destructive, but also constructive as one of the approaches of the West German 
public in coming to terms with the essential memorial conundrums given by Young is 
the use of counter-monuments (Young 1994, 414). The use of very public means, 
such as counter-monuments, with which to confront the public helped to instil a larger 
sense of self-imposed collective liability that Arendt and Jaspers agree upon as best 
being described as a “collective responsibility in terms of a liability predicated on 
political association that does not impute blame” (Schaap 2001, 749). Schaap argues 
that this collective responsibility came about as the West Germany was able to meet 
his criteria for achieving reconciliation, “collective accounting for past wrongs and 
responding to the suffering of those wronged is widely perceived as a necessary 
condition for achieving reconciliation in these societies” (Schaap 2001, 749).  
With the earlier mentioned allied abandonment of the strategy of collective 
guilt in 1951 West Germany in mind whilst looking at the progress West Germany 
made in meeting the criteria for reconciliation on its own, it is clear that reconciliation 
cannot be forced even by a international coalition of superpowers. It is on this basis 
that the usual excuse for a lack of academic investigation into the missing Spanish 
reconciliation being that one case was forced by an invasion of superpowers and the 
other was not is simply not good enough. To answer the research question, this paper 
must first fill the gap in literature by analysing how Suárez and his cabinet 
participated in the creation of hegemonic memory. From there it will fill the gap in 
literature on West German guilt in order to better analyse how the West German 
political leadership handled human rights and memory discourse. Only in filling these 
gaps in literature can academia successfully pinpoint the decisions that led to Spain’s 
failure to reconcile. 
Research design  
 
The main focus of this paper will very much be on the Within-case analysis of the key 
policy makers in West Germany post Second World War and Spain during and after 
the transition to democracy in 1978 giving the paper a scope of approximately forty 
years (1945-1985). In the second chapter focusing on the West German case and the 
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Spanish case, this paper will examine the identities and backgrounds of key policy 
makers in an effort to better examine the factors involved in the decision making that 
led a newly democratic Spain down a very different path to reconciliation to that of 
West Germany at a time when the fruits of the West German experiment with 
collective guilt could be seen. Through the method of first examining key individuals 
and their motives in each case separately, this paper will attempt to identify 
mechanisms behind the attempts to and not to reconcile using targeted pattern 
matching rather than process tracing as this paper believes that targeted pattern 
matching would be better suited to a small scale analysis of rational actors.  
 
The key individuals in question whose backgrounds and actions will be 
examined are those that made up the Spanish transitional government as they had to 
tread carefully during the democratisation period and any links with persons that may 
have committed crimes may demonstrate pressure to avoid a reconciliation process 
closer to the West German model. Transition figures such as Suárez stood to gain a 
lot in the democratisation process and he, a known wheeler-dealer, may have made 
concessions to ensure his place as prime minister. With this paper focusing on a gap 
in literature yet to be filled, there are no sufficient theories to make use of congruence 
analysis in this paper. The analysis of memory politics, how memory is manipulated 
in politics by memory entrepreneurs in positions of power, in both the Spanish and 
West German cases through the use of primary and secondary sources will play a key 
role in this paper as it is key to understanding the reconciliation process of a state – 
exactly what the research question is investigating (Auchter 2014, 7). This analysis of 
the role of memory politics within the Spanish and German transitional governments, 
and policies such as the Pact of Forgetting will be accomplished through an analysis 
of primarily primary sources such as the wording used in the dominant political 
narrative and the wording used in the dominant cultural narrative as “in politics, 
collective memory exerts its influence both from the bottom up, as interpretations of 
the past affect the identities and understandings of political elites, as well as from the 
top down, as statements by public figures place certain events into the national 
consciousness while silencing or forgetting others” (Verovšek 2016, 529).  
 
Secondary sources in the form of academic papers will also be utilised in the 
analysis of the role of memory politics within the Spanish and German transitional 
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governments, and the Pact of Forgetting in order to capture a broader perspective of 
German and Spanish society as a whole. Data collection through the use of 
quantitative methods such as surveys and qualitative methods such as directly 
contacting individuals of interest will allow this paper to better argue the role of 
popular media outlets had in influencing the Spanish public’s reception of the Pact of 
Forgetting in comparison with the German case. Interviews with the Spanish public of 
different political persuasions will allow for a better perspective of the influence that 
Spanish policymakers behind the role of Francoist monuments and the lack of counter 
narratives had in comparison with the German case.  
 
Character analysis will then allow for this paper to better identify at what point 
the Spanish transitional government chose not to go through the process of 
reconciliation like the West Germans did and why. During the second chapter this 
paper will then conduct a brief Between-case analysis using the information that will 
have been garnered from the Within-case analysis of the democratisation, 
reconciliation process of West Germany post-Second World War in the second 
chapter, and the democratisation but lack of a reconciliation process in Spain post-
Franco to identify necessary causation and sufficient causation in order to better 
answer the research question and strengthen the Within-case analysis. In lacking the 
theories necessary for a focused comparison due to a lack of academia on this topic, 
this paper will instead focus on across case analysis in its Between-case analysis in 
order to compare similar cases, attributes and typology to better identify where the 
similarities end and where the differences begin thereby mapping out the role of 
human agency to the extent that one or several actions done differently from the West 
German example can be blamed for the massive divergence that has now sprouted 
from such a similar process of democratisation. 
 
 
Chapter 1: Setting scenes 
 
1.1 The impact of the Pact of Forgetting on contemporary Spain  
 
Of all the Facebook accounts linked with right and far right organisations such as 
VOX, La Falange, the unofficial Alianza Nacional and Falange Española de las JONS 
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that were contacted for the research presented in this paper, the issue that is halting 
any prospect of a Spanish reconciliation can be succinctly summed up in the about 
section of the La Falange Facebook account that reads, “Frente al separatismo: ni 
negaciacón ni olvido ni perdón” – “faced with separatism: neither negotiation nor 
forgetfulness nor forgiveness” (Facebook). The phrasing may well be an intentional 
use of olvido (forgetfulness) as nod to el pacto del olvido (the Pact of Forgetting) as 
many on the right as well as the left do not agree with such a pact with 100% of right 
leaning respondents in Figure 1 saying that they felt had been affected by the pact 
with one respondent saying “Si te refieres a la transición, sirvió para blanquear los 
crímenes de la izquierda y sacar a la calle a terroristas presos” – “If you mean the 
transition, it served to whitewash the crimes of the left and release imprisoned”, and 
another responding, “Ya son dos generaciones de españoles las que han crecido 
ignorando la verdadera historia en el mejor de los casos, y aprendiendo a odiar a 
España en el peor” – “It's already two generations of Spaniards who have grown up 
ignoring the true story at best, and learning to hate Spain at worst”. The two responses 
showcase two very classic fallacies of the Spanish right; that the Pact of Forgetting 
served only those that had committed crimes on the left, as they only saw the left as 
having committed any crimes, and that the left has recently managed to get to the 
children and teach them lies about Spain as much of that they learn is contrary to what 
the previous generations of their family had learnt. The former is incorrect as the Pact 
of Forgetting not only overlooked much more grievous crimes of the right, but a 
smaller number of people and crimes; “no judicial proceedings taken against anyone 
who had committed crimes against humanity in defence of the previous regime (i.e. 
those guilty of the Francoist repression) or crimes of terrorism committed against said 
regime (i.e. members of the post-Civil War guerrilla groups, ETA, FRAP and 
GRAPO), a dramatically smaller number” (Preston 2018). In regards to the latter, an 
almost withdrawal syndrome from Franco’s propaganda machine can be observed as 
“for almost four decades [after his death] General Francisco Franco was someone 
Spaniards could not escape. He was there in school books, church prayers, statues, 
plaques, street names and thousands of other reminders of a violent insurrection that 
led to a vicious civil war”, and so the history and way of life for many was suddenly 
different to that of their children and thus conspiracy theories were prompted from the 
right (The Guardian 2009). After decades of learning to admire the accomplishments 
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of Franco, the sudden change in stance of the establishment appeared to many on the 
right to be nothing more than the left attacking Franco’s legacy through the youth. 
 The fallacy of right wing victimisation is still very much a part of the Spanish 
political environment to this day as “what some see as the necessary exposure of still 
open wounds to the light of day in order to heal, others see as the reopening of 
wounds that have already healed” (Hadzelek 2012, 154). There are no wounds so 
deep nor so open in Spanish society as the unknown fates of Republicans and others 
that Franco saw as his opponents. There is no call for an investigation into 
unaccounted for bodies from the Spanish right as the bodies of those fighting for 
Franco during the Spanish Civil War were “exhumed at the end of the Civil War and 
their graves inscribed with the phrase Caídos por Dios y por España (Those who fell 
for God and for Spain)” and buried in the Valle de los Caídos (Encarnación 2008). 
Those volunteering for the Nazis in the Blue Division and later Blue Legion have 
been exhumed and repatriated at taxpayers’ expense under the People’s Party’s 
(Partido Popular) José Mariá Aznar to the Vault of the Blue Division in the 
Cementerio de la Almudena in Madrid (Encarnación 2008, 143).  
The Spanish right are very much the gatekeepers of memory politics thanks to 
the Pact of Forgetting and the October 1977 Amnesty Law, both of which are still in 
place, and with all but republican bodies accounted for, the right can claim “we have 
had enough of unburying the dead” (Gálvez Biesca 2006, 31). The 1981 threat of 
violence in the form of a military coup stopped any exhumations of the republican 
war dead and those that were disappeared under Franco between 1981 and 2000 
(González-Ruibal 2007, 205). Even a socialist government did not dare to go too far 
in its 2007 Historical Memory Law, an attempt at revising the Pact of Forgetting, in 
just limiting its amendments to the removal of public Francoist symbols and 
monuments, as well as recognising the international brigades (González 2009, 182). 
The Spanish right showed signs of compromise in 2011 when the Partido Popular 
regained power under Rajoy and did not quash the 2007 Historical Memory Law, but 
they instead closed the La Oficina de Victimas (the Office of Victims), the 
governmental department in charge of exhuming Franco’s victims (ElPlural.com 
2012). As with many states where victimised portions of the population attempt 
reconciliation, the state will appease the opposition to an extent only to take back 
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power through other means. This less than absolute stance of the Spanish right does 
not correlate with any threat that may prove a causal relation, but it does come at a 
time when many that may have be found guilty for crimes in the Spanish Civil War, 
the Second World War and under Franco’s rule are dying out.  
 Currently, all illegal parties in Spain are left wing and independence oriented 
parties that have been made illegal due to the sometimes-unsubstantiated claims that 
they have links to left-wing terror groups. The list of illegal parties in Spain is 
currently limited to; Eusko Abertzale Ekintza (Basque Nationalist Action), Partido 
Comunista de las Tierras Vascas (Communist Party of the Basque Homelands), 
Euskal Herritarrok (Basque Citizens), Batasuna (Unity), Herritarren Zerrenda (List of 
Fellow Citizens), Demokrazia Hiru Milioi (Democracy 3,000,000), and Askatasuna 
(Freedom). However, self-proclaimed continuations of far-right parties that once led 
the call to fascism in Spain during the early 20th Century like the falangist Falange 
Española de las JONS are still active and legal irrespective of their links with far-right 
terrorism (Rodríguez Jiménez 2009, 142). Clearly, reconciliation has not yet occurred 
in Spain and nor will it with the current course of events. In order to understand how 
Spain may start to address its issue with past, more attention needs to be brought to 
the circumstances in which the Pact of Forgetting came about. 
 
1.2 The impact of reconciliation on contemporary Germany 
 
The German reconciliation process changed German society completely as it saw 
Germany filled with memorials and counter-memorials to victims funded by state and 
non-state actors and a large role in its styling and meaning given to the survivors of 
the atrocity being memorialised. An earlier mentioned example of such a memorial 
being the 2005 Berlin Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe (pictured). 
Everything about this memorial makes it a classic example of a bottom-up approach 
to memorialisation and a victory of civil society. As can be expected from a counter-
memorial, it was conceived at the movement’s peak during the 1980s by members of 
civil society that were disappointed with the lack of memorials dedicated to Jewish 
Holocaust victims (Stiftung Denkmal Für Die Ermordeten Juden Europas). With 
growing support for the project, the reunified German government in 1995 opened a 
public design competition and funded the winning design through the state-funded 
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Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe Foundation (Stiftung Denkmal Für Die 
Ermordeten Juden Europas). The memorial stands testament to the openness of the 
West German and later reunified German governments when it came to discussing the 
past and empowering civil society and recognising its claims. 
 
 
(https://cdn.modlar.com/photos/3963/img/s_1920_x/7_574117271d8b8.jpg) 
 
This sets Germany apart from Spain that had the Pact of Forgetting as 
memorials constructed and given meaning by offending governments only serve their 
agenda, as memorials are reliant on context for their significance. Currently, symbols 
of inappropriate parties including “flags, insignia, uniforms, slogans and forms of 
greeting” are illegal in Germany under section 86a of the German criminal code 
(Strafgesetzbuch 1998). The current ban on inappropriate symbolism is an extension 
on the 1949 criminalisation of the swastika without lobbies trying to protect the 
symbol as seen in Spain, possibly because such lobbies as the Heidelberg circle were 
too busy trying to amnesty leading Nazi officials (POLITICO 2017) (Frei 2002, 12-
13). More recently, the law has gone beyond just the physical realm to combat any 
alternative claims and to maintain the current hegemonic memory via the creation of 
memory laws whereby holocaust denial is now an imprisonable offence under section 
130 of the German criminal code (Strafgesetzbuch 1998).  
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Memory still plays a large part in advancing the collective guilt expressed in 
collective responsibility as generations strive to understand the past whether it be 
holocaust survivors revisiting Auschwitz on Holocaust remembrance day or the 
grandson of Rudolf Höss, Auschwitz’s commandant, coming to terms with his 
grandfather’s crimes and in the process preventing the same (The Times of Israel 
2014). Although the Germans, unlike the Spanish, have days of remembrance and 
well-maintained concentration camps to look to as vehicles for memory, nowhere is 
the collective guilt better demonstrated than in the compensation payments to victims 
of the Nazi regime that totalled 53 billion DM by 1978 (Sagi 1980, 196). The 
payments that were literally paid by the West German people to victims of the former 
regime demonstrates an acknowledgment of the suffering that was experienced and a 
shared responsibility amongst the German public for the consequences.  
 
Although the Spanish left has be reluctant to make many amendments to the 
Pact of Forgetting, the German left feels a sense of ‘responsibility’ to keep German 
politics as politically centrist as possible. This leads to parties like the SPD being 
quick to liken policies like those of the AfD to those of the Nazi regime (Reuters 
2017). With so many vehicles for memory, a critical left, and laws to maintain the 
hegemonic memory, West Germany has been successful in creating a culture of 
collective responsibility and guilt. 
 
 
1.3 The historical background of the Spanish case 
 
When it comes to the question of why reconciliation has not occurred, it is imperative 
that the groups that need to reconcile are known. The Carlists and Falangists under the 
command of Franco made victims of nationalists, Jews, republicans, communists, and 
liberals, and refused to recognise their victimhood until Zapatero’s socialist 
government’s 2007 law of historical memory that recognized victims on both sides, a 
refusal that has a lasting effect on the believability of victims (Ley de la Memoria 
Históica – Ley 52/2007). Although the Spanish and German cases occurred for 
different reasons, the atrocities committed and those committing them were very 
much cut from the same cloth and kept close relations throughout with Raymond 
writing “He [Franco] and his men were made of the same stuff as those most open 
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minds of the Nazi Holocaust – we have the diaries of Himmler, the memoir of Hoess, 
for example. Men who killed less like machines, more like bureaucrats, signing 
forms, buried in paperwork rather than corpses, solving problems of logistics that 
were in practice genocidal solutions” (Raymond 2012). These close relations between 
the Nazis and Franco regime were very much reflected in not only their hatred of 
communists, liberals and Jews, but use of a modified historical memory; the 
hegemonic Francoist memory “was based on the need to justify the military coup 
against the democratically elected government and the planned slaughter that the coup 
would entail” (Preston 2008, epilogue). This entailed a threat of a Jewish-Bolshevik-
Masonic conspiracy and like their Nazi allies, the Franco regime capitalised heavily 
on anti-Semitic sentiment. Although the Franco regime did not systematically kill 
Jews like their allies, they did expect the Jewish population to leave and refused 
sanctuary to many fleeing the Nazi genocide. As soon as he saw the tide of the 
Second War changing, Franco “began to whitewash his image. It is no surprise that, 
encouraged by the regime, soon, in 1949, books started to be published such 
as España y los judíos (Spain and the Jews), which were gestures of rapprochement” 
(Preston 2008).  
 
Republicans, socialists, liberals and communists were grouped together simply 
as anyone that was believed to oppose the Franco regime and “waves of these 
individuals were condemned on mere hearsay without trial, loaded onto trucks, taken 
to deserted areas outside city boundaries, summarily shot, and buried in mass, shallow 
graves that began dotting the Spanish countryside in the wake of the advancing 
Nationalist” (Guarino 2010, 65).  
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Those that were not shot were either imprisoned for life sentences or forced to 
build the 1959 Valle de los Caídos (pictured), a monument that Franco taught the 
Spanish public through state propaganda to believe was a monument to Spanish 
national reconciliation, a non-truth that is still believed and circulated to this day 
(Graham 2004, 29) (Alcaine 2010, 5). Although the neo-classical contemporaries of 
the Nazi architect Speer, Muguruza and Méndez, are commonly credited with 
designing the grandiose monument, the monument was very much the brainchild of 
Franco and the two architects were merely hired to realise the Caudillo’s plans 
(Preston 1996, 352). Being as extreme an example of a top-down approach to 
memorialisation as it gets, Valle de los Caídos did not empower civil society to 
memorialise on their own terms like in the West German case, but rather it enabled 
the Francoist memory of events to win the memory struggle and repress all other 
memories. With such memorials being the vehicles for the hegemonic Francoist 
memory and the only narrative in public memorialisation, it is clear to see where the 
failure of reconciliation in Spain stems from.  
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It is not only those that were forced to build the Francoist memorials that have 
been let down by the Spanish government and lack of attempts at reconciliation as a 
method of appeasing surviving and known victims of unjust imprisonment under 
Franco, the Spanish government introduced a law in 1984 deeming years that had 
been spent imprisoned as “years contributing to Social Security” (Parades 128). 
Unfortunately, there was no such appeasement for homosexuals that endangered the 
Francoist “macho” ideal as they were left in prisons and mental asylums being 
administered shock therapy, even after the transition to democracy under the “social 
dangers and rehabilitation” law (The Guardian 2001). 
 
Republican and ‘repatriated’ children were sent to state-run institutions whilst 
the small children of prisoners were adopted by Francoist families leaving many 
broken families (Graham 2004, 29). This move has been labeled an attempt at a 
repression of the left and a cultural genocide by an ongoing court case filed by human 
rights lawyers Slepoy and Messuti with the backing of more than 150 victims and 
relations of victims (El País 2013). The children in Catalan, Valencian, Basque, 
Galician, Aranese, Asturian, Leonese, Aragonese Extremaduran, and Fala speaking 
areas that weren’t rehomed were instead forced to only speak Spanish outside of the 
household between 1939 and 1975, a move that has been criticised as an attempt at a 
cultural genocide (Escobar Urmeneta and Unamuno 2008, 229). 
 
In summary, the groups that the Francoists needed to reconcile with in the 
Spanish case consisted of suspected nationalists, republicans, communists, liberals, 
homosexuals, repressed speakers of regional languages and the children of these 
groups who never knew their parents or culture. 
 
1.4 The historical background of the German Case 
 
To maintain scope, this paper will only discuss the domestic victims of the Nazi 
regime. The recognition of victims is a process in itself that, if accomplished, is 
fundamental to the reconciliation process. Although the many of the remaining high-
ranking Nazis were prosecuted at Nuremberg, the indictments, such as crimes against 
humanity, were broad, identified few groupings of victims, and were subject to the 
attitudes of the period. Because of this, this paper will chronologically list victims by 
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the date at which they were acknowledged by the (West) German society in order to 
better contextualise history and filter out claims of victimhood by those underserving 
of it such as persecuted Nazis. Included in such a list are at least 25,000 dead 
communists and socialists recognised in 1949 (Greene 2014), 1,250-5,000 dead 
Jehovah’s Witnesses recognised in 1949 (Shulman 2000), 160,000-180,000 dead 
German Jews that were recognised in 1952 (United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum), the 400,000 handicapped dead that were barely referred to due to the 
stigma, but nonetheless memorialised by a small plaque for decades until the 1990s 
(Schmuhl 2001, 316), 25,000 murdered Roma were recognised in 1982 (Lewy 2000, 
221-222), an unknown number of oppressed followers of the Baháí Faith that were 
only recognised after 1991 due to a small following, an unknown number of sterilised 
people of colour that only entered public consciousness from 2000s academia in 2010 
in a Deutsche Welle article and are yet to be memorialised, and 5,000-15,000 dead 
homosexuals formally recognised in 2017 after decades of persecution (Harran et al. 
2000, 108). 
 
 In March 1933, construction for the first concentration camp in Dachau started 
as Hitler gained plenary powers under the 1933 Enabling Act. Dachau was originally 
constructed to contain political prisoners such as suspected communists and socialists 
through to trade unionists, all identifiable by a red triangle. Along with the internment 
of political prisoners under the new powers, the Nazi regime also targeted religious 
groups such as the Baháí Faith and Jehovah’s Witnesses for fear of them allowing 
fragmentation and pacifism amongst the German people (Garbe and Grimm 2006, 
100-102). Those considered to have genetic disorders or part of the German black 
minority were forcibly sterilised under the 1933 sterilisation law as the first of many 
racial hygiene policies. Homosexuals incarcerated under the Nazis, in mainly standard 
prisons, were able to bargain for reduced sentences in return for sterilisation (United 
States Holocaust Memorial Museum). The 1935 Nuremberg laws legally enforced the 
Nazi social Darwinist concepts of who was “untermensch” and who was 
“übermensch” based on race. With the categorisation of “untermensch”, Jews, 
gypsies, and all races considered other than the Nordic, Persian, Japanese, and 
Chinese “races” lost all rights both political and civil. Without citizenship, loss of 
assets, and restrictions on relations with the “übermensch”, many targeted groups left 
Nazi Germany. With the failure of the Madagascan plan in 1942, Jehovah’s Witnesses 
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imprisoned from 1935 were able to leave for menial labour as concentration camps 
started to receive a wider range of inhabitants including Jews, gypsies, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, and a minority of the incarcerated homosexual population. Members of 
such groups were either used as a sterilised labour force or killed (Letter from SS-
Oberführer Viktor Brack to Reichsführer-SS Himmler, June 23, 1942).   
 
 Clearly, Germany post-Second World War had many victims and their 
families to reconcile with, so how did the West German reconciliation attempt differ 
so much from the Spanish attempt considering many of the groups that were targeted 
in the same way? 
 
 
Chapter 2: The two cases 
 
Although the Allies had sentenced high ranking Nazis to death and imprisonment for 
their crimes, that was not enough to close rifts between groups or to ease the suffering 
of the victims and their families as opposed to what the revisionist school of thought 
will have you believe. Like Spain, West Germany’s government was battling to 
maintain its position and domestic stability in order to avoid the threat of violence 
posed by parties both domestic and foreign when they regained power from the allies 
in 1949 (Frei 2002, xi).  
 
With the Allied denazification process increasingly becoming a witch-hunt 
that separated the public into the category of “politically objectionable” or “politically 
unobjectionable” even after almost the entire senior Nazi leadership had been 
processed, in 1949 German Chancellor Adenauer and others became increasingly in 
favour of an alternative in calling for denazification to “vanish as fast as possible” 
(Bundesarchiv B136/3769). The 1949 Bundestag was made up of many parties 
including the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) that were made illegal 
and its members oppressed due to their opposition to the Nazi regime and so now 
legalised, SPD members, like Löbe, were not prepared to embrace the collective guilt 
that denazification instilled (Wahlperiode 1 1949, 1f). The Bundestag preferred a 
more nuanced concept of collective guilt that was more self-imposed than directly 
imposed (Frei 2002, 1).  
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With a nuanced concept of collective guilt that could be agreed upon, the 
Bundestag could turn its attention to the possibility of an amnesty for the German 
people. With the representation of both ends of the political spectrum, the amnesty 
could be shaped to the liking of both supporters of the previous regime as well as the 
victims of the very same regime. Even Alfred Loritz’s Wirtschaftliche Aufbau-
Vereinigung (WAV), a right-wing populist party that reached out to lower ranking 
Nazis, suggested an amnesty that only extended to what the penal laws would 
determine to be “misdemeanours” and “infractions” (Connor 2007, 126) (Bundestag-
Drucksachen 1, Wahlperiode 27, 21 Sept. 1949). In early 1951 the Amnesty Law 
amnestied sentences of up to a year, allowing many former functionaries of the SA, 
Nazi Party and SS, also known as ‘301ers’, to return to governmental positions as 
their an amnesty was seen as the best method of buying their cooperation (Frei 2002, 
9, 17).  
 
Although easy to imagine that the increased presence of former-Nazis in the 
legal system would reduce the competency of trials of former-Nazis, prosecutors like 
Fritz Bauer relied upon the use of younger prosecutors and the cooperation of the 
Israeli state in bringing figures such as Eichmann to justice (Schüler-Springorum 
2016). The victims were also taken into consideration by the West German legal 
system, as pressure from Jewish groups allowed for survivors to reclaim assets 
although many assets were left in limbo due to lack of heirs and the majority of 
holocaust survivors living abroad. Pressure from groups paid off when in the 1952 
Claims Conference, the value of heirless assets was recognised and compensation was 
granted to the Israeli state for its $1.1 billion care for Nazi victims (Rosensaft and 
Rosensaft 2001, 36). Following this victory for primarily Jewish victims, the 1953 
Bundesergänzungsgesetz zur Entschädigung für Opfer der nationalsozialistischen 
Verfolgung (BErG), a restitution law, formalised the claimant process allowing for 
any private persons to claim compensation for personal damage and to reclaim assets. 
 
There was no silence after the Second World War as West Germans wanted a 
public debate on what had happened however politics and academia failed the public 
due to their Nazi links and so there was instead a civic cultural revolution (Schüler-
Springorum 2016). Films including the 1946 Die Mörder sind unter uns (The 
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murderers are amongst us), theatre including the Hochhuth’s 1963 Der Stellvertreter 
(The deputy), and the later 1978 Holocaust TV series kept the debate in the public 
sphere (Schüler-Springorum 2016). It was not before long the public debate seeped 
into the political and academic spheres through a younger generation that led to a shift 
during the mid-1960s from the question why the Nazi regime came about to a more 
critical line of questioning that attempted to identify who gained from the regime and 
its actions (Schüler-Springorum 2016). This change in the focus of academia during 
the late 1960s to early 1970s was also felt in political circles as Bavaria made trips to 
the Dachau concentration camp memorial an obligatory part of the school curriculum 
(Schüler-Springorum 2016). With a returning Jewish population, funding from the 
West German government, the rise of pressure groups like the Central Council of 
Jews in Germany and the Leo Baeck Institute that gave grants to academia with a 
more critical eye for the Nazi atrocities, survivors had the agency and the finance to 
bring the debate into the public sphere (Schüler-Springorum 2016). This agency was 
first seen in 1946 when memorialisation was discussed culminating in the first 
memorial site opened at the former Buchenwald concentration camp in 1949 (Stein 
and Stein 1993). 
 Buchenwald was only the first of many as between 1949 and up to the 1970s 
“Holocaust memorializing typically took the form of plaques and markers to indicate 
the locations of former synagogues, neighborhoods, cemeteries and other Jewishly 
identified sites eradicated by the Nazis” (Harris 2010, 34). Memorialisation also when 
beyond the physical as the People’s Day of Mourning, a day originally created to 
honour World War One victims, was revived with new meaning (Harris 2010, 35).  
Although the memorials were no way as sophisticated and imposing as the memorials 
that followed, they didn’t dramatise the contradiction and conflict that takes such a 
central position in contemporary memorials (Harris 2010, 35). With the success of 
Holocaust, attention to the Jewish victims really peaked during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s leading to more financing of memorials at which time were still 
traditional nineteenth century style memorials almost reminiscent of the grandiose 
Nazi style (Lupu 2003, 130-131). With the sheer amount of memorials being 
constructed it was only a matter of time before the horrific past began to go through a 
process of “normalization” leading to a wave of counter-memorials that aimed to 
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challenge the previous trend of memorialisation by aiming to be “ephemeral rather 
than permanent” (Lupu 2003, 131). 
 Clearly, the reconciliation through restitution and recognition that could be 
observed in 1970s West Germany had its roots in the triumph of agency during the 
late 1940s and early 1950s. With such international events as the 1952 claims 
conference, the 1961 Eichmann trial, and even the Series Holocaust being shown on 
Spanish state television (TVE) in 1979, why wasn’t there a similar debate and 
reconciliation in Spain? 
There were two fears that influenced the actions of those managing the 
Spanish transition to democracy, the fear of high-level individuals being prosecuted 
for crimes committed during the Civil War and Second World War, and the fear of 
another civil war. The 1975 Pact of Forgetting and the later October 1977 Amnesty 
Law under Suárez’s government that “gave amnesty to all the crimes committed 
during the Dictatorship and Civil War” were both influenced heavily by both fears 
(Parades 2010, 132).  
Having been appointed as the transitional prime minister at the time the Pact 
of Forgetting was believed to be in effect, the two fears created several points of 
pressure upon Suárez and his cabinet. After Franco’s death the aim of the Falangist 
and Carlist movements had been accomplished as Carlos was King and Spain had 
been saved from the communist threat and with an ever more international emphasis 
on democracy and the pull of the European Communities, there were many reasons to 
democratise. However, Franco had left behind an idea of what he what he wanted this 
new democratised Spain to look like which included continued repression of the left. 
King Carlos tasked Suárez as prime minister with the aim of overseeing the transition 
and removing what was left of the old regime, as there was a possibility to benefit to 
the Spanish people both socially and economically. 
There was also a lot of pressure from all elites for a full amnesty to ensure 
their survival as all had seen what happened to the Nazi leadership post-Second 
World War and what happened to the junta in Greece in 1975. The ETA and other 
leftist armed groups would only come to the table for a functioning democracy if 
there could be a release of their political figures leading to the 30th July 1976 amnesty, 
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and eventually operatives under the 20th May 1977 full amnesty. As discussed in 
chapter 1.1, law 46/1977 of 15th October 1977 or the “Amnesty Law” was much more 
aimed at those guilty of crimes of the right and brought solace and security to those 
that had committed them as by committing atrocities together, a non-spoken pact was 
created during the Civil War, a Pact of Blood (Preston 1986, 3). The Pact of Blood 
allowed for “networks of patronage and corruption” as many Francoists relied on each 
other to maintain the agreed upon silence and to silence victims through the creation 
of Pact of Forgetting and the October 1977 Amnesty Law (Preston 1986, 3).  
So why was the amnesty law so broad considering the disproportionate 
amount of atrocities being committed by the right? Although the 15th June 1977 
election ensured representation of the left with the Spanish Socialist Workers Party 
holding 29.32% of the congress of deputies and the Communist Party of Spain with 
9.33%, the left’s elite was nonetheless in fear and out of touch. The fear was of a coup 
was so great that when Suárez announced the communist party’s legalisation on 9th 
April 1977, he had been sure to announce it whilst the military elite were out of town 
for fear of a coup (Preston 2004, 385, 386). In return for such a risk, Suárez was able 
to ask for their loyalty to the crown and the new government, an arrangement that 
likely ensured the communist party’s support for the 1977 Amnesty Law (Preston 
2004, 384). Although the left in general was fearful for their position and worked with 
Suárez, they were unlikely to bring up the crimes committed by the right as the 
leadership that Suárez was negotiating with was made up of elites that never 
experienced the crimes that their brethren had experienced and so had little interest in 
discussing them on that basis (Martin-Cabrera 2011, 157, 186). On this basis, the 
Spanish case did not have a left whose position was lawful enough, secure enough 
and experiences horrific enough to successfully define the 1977 Amnesty Law in such 
a way that the right may have been successfully targeted.   
With the earlier mentioned Pact of Blood ensuring a sense of fraternity 
between Francoists, who made up Suárez’s cabinet and what ties did they have to 
Franco’s atrocities that may have influenced their decision-making as well as 
Suárez’s? Suárez’s earlier discussed ties to Franco as Director-General of the Spanish 
Radio and Television Corporation, a position that put him in charge of Franco’s 
propaganda, are similar to those of the other members of his transitional cabinet. 
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Suárez’s deputies, Fernando Santiago y Díaz, a general during the Spanish Civil, and 
Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado, who led three platoons of the Information and Military 
Police Service (SIPM) during the Spanish Civil War (Relación Jurada De Méritos y 
Servicios Que Concurren En El Capitán De Artillería Don Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado 
1939, 1-4), were both in strong positions with reason to influence Suárez’s decision to 
propose a far-reaching amnesty (Chislett 2013, 82).  
Service amongst Suárez’s cabinet during the Spanish Civil War was not 
limited to higher ranks as Félix Álvarez-Arenas Pacheco, minister of the army, Carlos 
Franco Iribarnegaray, minister of the air force, Admiral Gabriel Pita da Veiga, 
minister of the navy until 9th April 1977, and Admiral Pascual Pery, minister of the 
navy post-9th April 1977, all served at relatively low ranks and were none the less part 
of this fraternal Pact of Blood. 
Even those in the cabinet without a military background had reason to avoid 
investigations into missing persons as many cabinet members had friends and family 
that served with the nationalists during the Spanish Civil War and some even 
committed atrocities post-Civil War. Rodolfo Martín Villa, minister of the interior 
under Suárez, is currently accused of several crimes including ordering the executions 
of five workers during strikes in 1976 (El País 2013). Villa is also accused of ordering 
“General Secretary of the Movement, Ignacio García López, to destroy all of the 
Falange’s documents and archives” in 1977, inline with the Amnesty Law, by 
academics including Armengou, Bellis and del Río Sánchez (Martín-Cabrera 2011, 
185-186).  
Those with positions of power that could pressure Suárez’s proposed amnesty 
and had an interest in avoiding investigations into crimes during Franco’s regime are 
not limited to just Suárez’s cabinet. Antonio María Oriol y Urquijo, a member of one 
of the families sustaining the Franco regime, served as the Minister of Justice 1965-
1973 and the President of the Spanish Council of State (Presidente del Consejo de 
Estado), the consultative council of the Spanish government, 1973-1979 (Rodríguez 
Jiménez 2009, 142). Lieutenant General Emilio Villaescusa Quilis was made 
President of the Supreme Council of Military Justice (CSJM) in 1976, a body that 
oversaw military justice, or lack thereof, during the reign of Franco and the creation 
of the Pact of Forgetting until the CSJM was disbanded under the Orgánica Law in 
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1987 (Ley Orgánica 4/1987). The Supreme Council of War and Navy (Consejo 
Supremo de Guerra y Marina), the precursor to the CSJM, had been dissolved under 
the Azana Law of the Second Spanish republic and its powers bestowed upon a sixth 
chamber of the Spanish supreme court, but fearing civil powers over the military 
sphere, it was quickly re-established as the CSJM under Franco (Ballbé 1983, 348) 
(Marzal Rodríguez 2005, 308). Lieutenant General Villaescusa Quilis was also a 
former Nazi volunteer of the Blue Division (División Azul) on the Eastern Front and 
one of several hundred surviving Blue Division members, the very same Blue 
Division whose dead were exhumed and repatriated at taxpayers’ expense under the 
People’s Party’s (Partido Popular) José Mariá Aznar (El País 2002) (The Telegraph 
2015) (Encarnación 2008). The CSJM and the Spanish Council of State had a strong 
relationship that went back four and a half centuries, meaning that both Antonio 
María Oriol y Urquijo and Lieutenant General Emilio Villaescusa Quilis had reason 
and access to the Suárez cabinet to influence the amnesty to their own ends (Valero 
Torrijos 2002, 110).  
The supposed 1977 abduction of Lieutenant General Emilio Villaescusa Quilis 
and Antonio María Oriol y Urquijo showed the sheer danger of domestic and foreign 
left-wing dissidents in Spain to all levels of Spanish society and reminded key 
decision makers that the block of Spanish society that had been persecuted under 
Franco would be “quite happy if it could start another civil war” (Hilton 2000). That 
being said, the timing and style of the abduction by a supposed armed wing of a 
previously non-existent group, GRAPO, was so convenient just four days from the 
referendum on political reform as a subject for the right’s fear tactics that the 
Commander in Chief of Military Staff, Mellado, believed it to be nothing more than a 
stunt by the police and far-right (Preston 2004, 379-380). This is only furthered by the 
fact that Moa, an accused pseudo-academic and former member of GRAPO, now 
heavily anti-left, has been able to succeed domestically with biased books on the 
Spanish Civil War without the accusations of breaching the 1977 Amnesty Law that 
others like Garzón face (Preston 2004, 379). 
Regardless of whether or not the GRAPO attempts at character assassinations 
of the left-wing leadership and fear tactics were part of a right-wing false flag 
operation, the pressure was most definitely on Suárez and his cabinet as the most 
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violence since the Spanish Civil War was seen in the streets of Spain (Preston 2004, 
380). Although insurgents were successful in the pressuring the cabinet, the true 
threat came from a coup that could use these events as justification. Suárez was 
identified as being treacherous by many ultras after legalising the communist party, 
leading to propaganda and shell organisations aimed at the military that gave the 
impression that the military was ready for a coup (Preston 2004, 388). Both this and 
the 1981 coup attempt would silence any discussion on, let alone excavations of 
Franco’s victims until the early 2000s causing a return to “the repression of memory” 
(Humlebæk 2014, 165). With the sustained threat of a coup and Francoists with an 
interest in concealing the horrors of the crimes that they had committed and positions 
of power to do so, it is unsurprising that the military archives housing local records of 
the disappeared have never been opened to the public and have instead been protected 
by José María Aznar’s government and successive governments since (Encarnación 
2008). With such a monopoly on information and threats of legal action, Francoists 
have been successful in impeding accusations and consequently avoided any form of 
reconciliation. 
 
However, West Germany’s politicians also failed the public so why wasn’t 
there a similar public or academic discussion? With a mass exodus of the most 
endangered republicans reaching 500,000 travelling to France in 1939 alone, few 
victims of Franco’s regime remained (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum). 
Of those that remained, Franco’s repression of memory was effective with 88.2% of 
the public “did not express their opinion for fear of retribution”, a far cry from the 
West German case where the threat of retribution was almost negligible (Encarnación 
2014, 183-184). This fear was no different for academics under Franco as all kinds of 
expression were branded subversive propaganda as poets and playwrights like 
Federico García Lorca had been known to be disappeared. The situation was hardly 
helped by the fact that the victims that remained had no leadership to lead the public 
debate as the elites of the left had made compromises in order to participate in 
elections and the Government of the Spanish Republic in exile (Gobierno de la 
República Española en el exilio) that had been abroad for decades dissolved itself 
with its recognition of the new democratic government on 21st July 1977 (Maldonado 
and Valera 1977). What’s more, there were no returning victims or institutions to 
bankroll and mastermind the kind of pressure, academia, or vehicles of memory seen 
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in West Germany. On this basis, there were no public vehicles for memory in Spain 
supporting a non-Francoist narrative and with the only memorials like Valle de los 
Caídos being state funded, the human rights camp in their grief would instead have to 
turn to vehicles for memory promoting the hegemonic Francoist memory. With 
decades of repression of memory, lack of vehicles for memory without the hegemonic 
memory, and a powerful narrative, there is next to no willingness to attempt 
retroactive transitional justice (Encarnación 2014,185-186). 
The October 1977 Amnesty Law would later prove to be incredibly effective 
with criminal charges being filed against the earlier mentioned Judge Baltasar Garzón 
without any chance of appeal for defying the Amnesty Law by simply investigating 
19 mass graves and indicting Franco and several deceased officials (The Guardian 
2012). This came even after the United Nations Human Rights Committee had 
deemed that crimes against humanity were “not subject to a statute of limitations”, 
leaving crimes against humanity committed by Franco’s forces well within Garzón’s 
purview (The United Nations Human Rights Committee 2009, 41). 
If external actors are so quick to pressure Spain now, why weren’t they during 
the transitional period? Although the republican dream of an Allied ousting of Franco 
was nearly realised, the shift of focus from the war on fascism to the Cold War mixed 
with Franco’s careful whitewashing of crimes to reinvent himself as a an anti-
communist ally left Franco firmly in power (Graham et al. 2014, 140). With the new 
focus on the on the Cold War order and the values that came with it, the only barrier 
for joining NATO was being a democracy, allowing Spain to secure its borders with 
next to no pressure based on its domestic politics when it joined in 1982 (Luelmo 
2016, 2-3). A very similar situation could be said of the European Communities as 
Spain could join if they met certain expectations for a democracy, but those 
expectations did not include “truth, justice, or reparations for past abuses” when they 
applied for membership in 1977 followed by their acceptance in 1986 (Ferrán and 
Hilbink 2017, 202). Clearly, the prestige that came with being a democracy allowed 
many institutions to overlook domestic injustices, as they were considered 
insignificant compared to the greater threat that the Cold War posed. It must also be 
noted that transitional justice was still in early days and having been only used twice 
before was far less respected than it is now.  
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In summary, the failure to reconcile in the Spanish case was due to the strong 
position of the nationalists and their network that allowed them to pressure the Suárez 
cabinet and elites of the left into proposing and passing a wide-reaching amnesty 
enforced by the 1977 Amnesty Law and protected from future investigation by the 
1975 Pact of Forgetting. Although the wide-reaching amnesty could not be better 
defined by political pressure, it did nonetheless ensure that the left’s political 
prisoners and armed wing were released and that the left could once again participate 
in Spanish politics. With the threat of a coup from the military and terror attacks from 
armed groups, all elites knew that to start a discussion about reparations and abuses or 
to recognise claims could bring Spain to yet another Civil War and so the discussion 
was left out of the political and academic sphere. There was no public discussion on 
the past as Francoist repression of memory had been incredibly successful in silencing 
claims for fear of punishment and of the few in the human rights camp left in Spain, 
there was no leadership to call action as those still alive had recognised the 
transitional government and had no reason to bring up claims that were neither their 
own nor fruitful to the compromise that had been struck with the remnants of the 
former regime. That combined with the lack of pressure from outside actors due to the 
new focus on the Cold War and Franco’s rebranding left victims isolated with no 
narrative of their own. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, reconciliation is no one single process and the reconciliation process 
can include more victims over time as more groups and crimes come to be recognised. 
This paper acknowledges that there were limits to what could be discussed as this 
paper focused primarily on the memory of the elites in order to maintain a narrow 
scope for research and so much of the relationship that human rights had with 
memory studies and their role in the two cases had to be left out. The heavy 
restrictions on and destruction of many of the Spanish records placed a serious limit 
on the amount of research that could go into the victims and crimes of the Spanish 
Civil War. Without a doubt, the challenges posed by the Pact of Forgetting only being 
a verbal agreement were the largest in the process of researching this paper as the 
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power play and concessions made have been lost in time leading to a reliance on other 
evidence in order to reach its conclusions.  
 
That being said, the narrow scope allowed this paper to fill two gaps in 
literature, the first being on 1970s human rights and memory discourse by analysing 
the Suárez cabinet and how it treated human rights and memory discourse, and the 
second being on West German guilt in order to pinpoint the decisions that led to 
Spain’s failure to reconcile. In filling these two gaps in literature, it can be understood 
that although there were similarities in that an earlier fascist regime had gone about 
systematically repressing and killing groups that it deemed to be enemies of the state 
creating many victims and asylum seekers, there were two differences that led to the 
decision not to reconcile, the differing influence of the former regime and the 
responsibility of the left.  
 
When West Germany ended the failed Allied denazification policy in 1951, 
the highest ranks of the Nazi leadership were either dead or being brought to justice, 
allowing the state to turn to restitution based upon claim without fear of retribution, 
spurred on by victim’s pressure groups. Nationalists responsible for atrocities 
committed in the Spanish case were still in positions of influence and had no intention 
of being prosecuted or faced with another civil war and so denied claims by the 
human rights camp through the 1975 Pact of Forgetting and the later 1977 Amnesty 
Law. Because of their continued positions of power, nationalists responsible for the 
atrocities were able to pressure Suárez to pick Civil War veterans Santiago y Diaz and 
Mellado as his deputies, putting them in good stead to ensure that the amnesty would 
be as broad as possible. 
 
As the left in the West German case had been repressed and incarcerated, it 
allowed them to take on the status of victims meaning that they would have little need 
for an amnesty compared with their Nazi compatriots. The Spanish left, however, 
were regarded as being far from victims after the republican crimes of the Civil War 
and continuing insurgency. This not only meant that they had less bargaining power 
in comparison with the West German example, but also more of an interest in a wider 
reaching amnesty for the members of their armed wings. 
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Because of these two differences, two decisions not to remember were made, 
the culpable nationalists were able to pressure the Suárez cabinet to choose a full 
amnesty and a threatened left in need of amnesty for some of its members chose to 
facilitate its passing in the Cortes. These two decisions silenced victims for more than 
two decades as they had been abandoned by the left’s elite and the exiled republican 
government that recognised that elite’s position. With a lack of counter-narrative, 
restrictions on the discussion of past crimes, and the threat of violence especially after 
the 1981 coup, the human rights camp reverted to the Franco era repression of 
memory.  
 
Although this outcome is far from ideal, it was the price of peace. Considering 
that not all Francoists had committed crimes and with an insurgency at the time, the 
West German style of prosecution and discussion of crimes would have caused 
another Civil War and so they skipped the prosecution procedure to ensure peace 
through an amnesty. The left’s decisions were also understandable as they had the 
pressures of trying to ensure the left’s representation in the Cortes as well as trying to 
maintain the peace. The true villains of this paper are the politicians and continuation 
school of thought members that did not participate in the Spanish Civil War and yet 
they at a time when there are only two known surviving nationalist veterans they 
continue to avoid any investigations into past crimes as a means to maintain the glory 
of Franco’s false history (The Telegraph 2008) (Limia 2013). 
 
Going forward, a new question has arisen out of the findings of this paper as 
now that the role of the Spanish elites in politicising their memory is known, how did 
Franco’s victims attempt to counter the hegemonic memory? 
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Figure 2. The percentage of the Right that believe that the Pact reconciled Spain 
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